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Abstract—Steganography is a technique that allows hidden 
transfer of data using some media such as Image, Audio, Video, 
Network Protocol or a Document, without its existence getting 
noticed. Over the past few years, a lot of research has been done in 
the field of Image, Video and Audio Steganography but very little 
work has been done in Network Steganography. A Network 
Steganography technique hides data in a Network Data Unit, i.e., a 
Network Protocol Packet. In this paper we present an algorithm 
ARPNetSteg that implements Network Steganography using the 
Address resolution protocol. Our technique is a robust technique 
that can transfer 44 bits of covert data per ARP reply packet. 
 
Keywords—Network Steganography, ARP Steganography, 
Covert Channel, Address Resolution Protocol, Protocol 
Steganography 
I. INTRODUCTION 
NFORMATION hiding has been one of the favorite areas of 
researchers since the past two decades. Various techniques 
have been proposed by researchers to implement information 
security using information hiding. One such technique is 
steganography. Steganography hides data inside a cover 
medium without being perceived. The common media that are 
used to implement steganography are images, audios, videos, 
network protocols, documents etc. Steganography is 
implemented by modulating those characteristics of the media 
that do not bring perceptible changes in the original media. The 
changes in characteristics are made as per the secret message. 
For example, in images the Least Significant Bit (LSB) of some 
or all pixels is modulated as per the secret message. If the secret 
bit matches with the LSB of the current pixel then no change is 
made otherwise the LSB is toggled. Many techniques have been 
proposed in literature for Image, Audio and Video 
Steganography, whereas very less work has been done in the 
field of Network Steganography. In this paper, we propose a 
Network Steganography technique which hides data in a 
Network data unit that is a Network Protocol Packet. A Network 
Protocol Packet is a logical entity that carries data over a 
network. This Network packet has two major components: a) 
Protocol Header b) Payload [1]. The protocol header carries all 
the control information relevant to this packet whereas the 
payload carries the actual data to be transferred over the 
network. Some of the vital protocols of networks are Internet 
Protocol, Address Resolution Protocol, Transmission Control 
Protocol etc. In our proposed technique, we make use of an 
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Packet to carry secret 
message over the network. ARP is responsible for mapping 
network layer address to the hardware address of a device. Since 
ARP operates in a Local Area Network (LAN) setup, our 
technique is implemented and experimented solely over a LAN.  
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Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes 
the background, working and format of Address Resolution 
Protocol. This section also briefly describes the concept of ARP 
spoofing, which is a well known vulnerability of networks. 
Section III gives brief overview of related work done in the field 
of Network Steganography using the Address Resolution 
Protocol. Section IV elaborates the proposed system. Section V 
describes the experimental study and results of experiments 
conducted on ARPNetSteg and section VI concludes the paper. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The word Steganography was defined by Trithemius in his 
book Steganographia [2]. The term Steganography was derived 
from two greek words, steganos that means hidden and graphia 
that means writing. Steganography is defined as undetectably 
altering a work to embed a secret message [3]. Steganography 
aims at hiding the very existence of a secret message. To conceal 
a message, a cover media is required. This cover media can be a 
document, an image, an audio, a video or a network protocol. 
Steganography is achieved by hiding the secret message into a 
cover message as shown in Fig. 1. 
Fig. 1. Steganography Process 
Network Steganography or Protocol Steganography, one of 
the classifications of Steganography has recently captured lot of 
the attention from researchers. The term Network steganography 
was used for the very first time by K. Szczypiorski in 2003 [4]. 
In this type of steganography, one tries to hide secret data in parts 
of the network packets carrying normal communication data over 
the networks without getting noticed. Due to increased use of 
internet and growth in high speed network technologies, even if 
one bit of information can be hidden and transferred in a packet, 
a large and popular website could lose approximately 26 GB of 
data annually [5].  
A network packet broadly consists of a header and payload. 
Header carries the control information of the packet whereas the 
Payload carries the actual information that needs to be 
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transferred. Network Steganography exploits both header and 
payload individually or together to hide the secret data. Network  
 
Steganography techniques can be classified into three categories:  
(1) Storage Based Techniques: These techniques hide data in 
the storage part of a PDU, which is either a packet’s header, or 
payload or both.  
(2) Timing Based Techniques: These techniques use the 
sequence numbers, delays or inter-packet timing interpretations 
to send secret data. 
 (3) Hybrid Techniques: These techniques use a combination 
of both Storage based techniques and Timing based techniques 
to send the covert data.  
In this paper, we exploit the Address Resolution Protocol [6] 
using a Storage based channel for sending covert data. 
A. Address Resolution Protocol 
The Address Resolution Protocol is a vital protocol of a 
Local Area Network (LAN) that is responsible for mapping a 
network protocol address to 48 bits Ethernet address for 
transmission on Ethernet hardware. The complete description of 
ARP was given by David C. Plummer in RFC 826 [6] in 
November 1982. The format of an ARP packet header is as 
shown in Fig. 2. 
 











Sender Hardware Address 
(4 Bytes) 
Sender Hardware Address 
(2 Bytes) 
Sender IP Address 
(2 Bytes) 
Sender IP Address 
(2 Bytes) 
Target Hardware Address 
(2 Bytes) 
Target Hardware Address (4 Bytes) 
Target IP Address (4 Bytes) 
Fig. 2. ARP Header Format 
The Hardware Type defines the protocol being used at data link 
layer. For Ethernet, the value of this field is 1. For IEEE 802., 
the value of this field is 6. The value 0 is reserved [6]. The 
Protocol Type field specifies the internetwork protocol for 
which ARP request is generated. For example, for Internet 
Protocol Version 4 (IPv4), the value of Protocol Type is 0x0800. 
Hardware address length field specifies the number of octets in 
hardware address. For example, for Ethernet address, the 
hardware address length is 6. Protocol Address length specifies 
the number of octets in Protocol Address. For example, for IPv4 
the protocol address length is 4. Operation field specifies the 
action being performed. Its value is set to 1 for ARP Request 
procedures while it is set to 2 for ARP Reply procedures. The 
Sender Hardware Address field holds the hardware address of 
the source. This field is variable in length and equals to the value 
in Hardware Address Length field. It is 6 bytes in case of 
Ethernet as shown in Fig. 2. The Sender IP address holds the IP 
address of the source. This field is also variable in length and 
equals the value in Protocol Length Field [7, 8]. The Target 
Hardware Address field holds the hardware address of the 
destination. This field is again variable in length and equals the 
value in the Hardware Address Length field. The Target IP 
address holds the IP address of the destination. Just like Sender 
IP Address field, this field is also variable in length and equals 
the value in Protocol Length Field. 
B. How ARP works? 
The Internet protocol provides interoperability of packet 
switching across a large variety of physical network types [8]. It 
requires a mapping between the physical address at link layer and 
logical address at the network layer. ARP provides this mapping 
among various address types. When two hosts want to 
communicate over a network, they should know both each 
other’s hardware address and the IP address. ARP is a vital 
network protocol in a local area network that helps a node to 
identify the hardware address of another node whose IP address 
is already known. For this, the host that needs to identify the 
hardware address of other device, sends an ARP Broadcast 
Request over the network as shown in Fig 3. This Broadcast 
Request contains the IP address of the node whose machine 
address is needed. The response to this ARP request is generated 
by a machine whose IP address matches the one in the Target IP 
Address field of the ARP request packet. The machine writes its 
hardware address in this ARP reply packet and unicasts it to the 
original source as shown in Fig 4. 
 
 
Fig. 3. ARP Request Process 
 
Fig. 4. ARP Reply Process 
C. ARP Spoofing 
The Address Resolution Protocol provides no mechanism 
for authenticating the source address of a machine sending an 
ARP response. A proxy ARP is a system which replies on behalf 
of some other system, normally as a part of network design [8].  
On the other hand, in ARP spoofing, a spoofer responds to an 
ARP request sent for another system, mostly with a malicious 
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intent to intercept the data being sent to that authentic system. 
ARP is a stateless protocol, i.e. all the nodes over a network 
maintain an individual copy of ARP cache table stored in their 
own devices. This table stores the paired entries of IP addresses 
and their corresponding MAC addresses for the nodes in the 
network. This table is created and updated as and when a new 
ARP reply is received, regardless of whether any ARP request 
is made by this node or not. Whenever a new ARP reply is 
received for an existing entry, this entry is updated even if the 
older entry has yet not expired. In our proposed method, we 
partially make use of this technique, by spoofing for local IP 
addresses which are not presently being used by any node over 
a LAN. 
III. Related Work 
Since past few years, researchers have been working in the field 
of Network Steganography. Many Network Steganography 
techniques have been proposed and developed in protocols used 
in TCP/IP Networks. Handel and Stanford [9] discussed various 
covert channels possible in OSI model. Authors in [10-13] 
proposed various techniques to develop covert channels using 
the protocols used in TCP/IP model. K. Szczypiorski, M. 
Drzymała, and M. Ł. Urbański [14] proposed a covert channel 
using the DNS protocol which works at the application layer. Z. 
Trabelsi and I. Jawhar [15] exploited the options field of IP 
header to develop a covert channel using the record route option. 
P.Bedi and A. Dua [16] used another option field called 
timestamp to implement a covert channel using IPv4 protocol. 
As per our knowledge, very few researchers have exploited the 
Address Resolution Protocol for Steganography. L. Ji, Y. Fan 
and C. Ma [17] proposed a covert channel using ARP. In their 
technique, they used target IP address field to encode the covert 
information. They used the last ‘t’ bits (where t lies between 4 
and 8) to store the secret information. To identify the ARP 
requests carrying covert information, the first ‘8-t’ bits of the 
last byte that encodes the sending second, are first inverted and 
then XORed with first ‘8-t’ covert bits of the first ‘t’ covert bits. 
B. Jankowski, W. Mazurczyk and K. Szczypiorski [18] 
proposed a method called PadSteg. This method implements 
inter-protocol network steganography (a technique that uses 
more than one protocol for implementing network 
steganography) which uses ARP and other protocols like TCP 
or ICMP to exploit Etherleak vulnerability to provide secret 
communications between a group of nodes in a LAN. 
Schmidbauer, Tobias, Steffen Wendzel, Aleksandra Mileva, 
and Wojciech Mazurczyk [19] used the concepts of dead drops 
in ARP caches maintained at a host and SNMP to store and read 
the covert data respectively. A third party node in a LAN is used 
as a dead drop. The Covert message sender drops covert 
information in this node’s ARP Cache and a Covert Message 
Receiver retrieves covert information from this ARP Cache 
using SNMP protocol. In our technique, we use intra-protocol 
steganography (Protocol steganography technique that uses a 
single network protocol) using ARP protocol that partially uses 
the concept of ARP spoofing to transfer covert data over a local 
area network. Our scheme provides a bandwidth of 44 bits per 
ARP reply packet. 
IV. PROPOSED TECHNIQUE 
In this paper, we propose a technique that uses Address 
Resolution Protocol to implement Network Steganography. 
This technique works on a Local Area Network that has one 
covert message sender (Host A) and one covert message 
receiver (Host B). A series of steps at Host A and Host B are 
executed simultaneously to implement this technique. 
A. Sender Side Algorithm 
To begin with, we input a covert message string and 
compute its length. Next, we encode the covert message by 
converting the message string to hexadecimal code. After that 
we scan the local area network for free or unallocated local IP 
addresses (local IP addresses that are not being used over this 
LAN). This list is created by sending a broadcast request for all 
possible local IP addresses and then waiting for their respective 
ARP replies. The local IP addresses for which we receive ARP 
replies are assumed to be allocated ones and the rest for which 
no ARP replies are received, are added to the unallocated list. 
This step may be repeated to make sure that the list does not 
mistakenly add an allocated IP address whose reply is not 
received because of getting lost over the network. In the next 
step, we enter a seed value for random local IP address 
generation. The purpose of a seed is to generate the same set of 
random numbers for a given continuous set of numbers. In our 
case, we use same pre-known seed value at the sender and 
receiver side to generate same set of random local IP addresses 
from the unallocated list at both ends. A random number ‘x’, 
between 1 and 255 is generated with the common seed value 
described in the previous step. Further, we check if the address 
192.168.1.x is present in the unallocated list or not. In case this 
local IP address is not present in the unallocated list, the next 
random number is generated with the same seed value. This is 
repeated till the time we get an unallocated local IP address. 
Once an unallocated local IP address is found, the covert 
message sender waits for an ARP broadcast request from the 
covert message receiver (Host B) for this local IP address. 
After the awaited ARP request is received from the covert 
message receiver (Host B), the covert message sender begins to 
create an ARP reply for the same. It puts the first eleven or lesser 
(if message is smaller) hexadecimal digits of the covert message 
in the Sender Hardware Address field of ARP reply message. If 
covert message length is less that eleven hex-digits, these hex-
digits are padded to make it eleven hex-digits long. The last 
hexadecimal digit (quad) of the Ethernet address is used to store 
the control information (control quad). This control quad mainly 
carries the information if the message being carried is over or 
more message data needs to be sent in later packets. That is, this 
control quad decides whether more ARP requests are to be 
generated by the covert message receiver or not. If more 
message data is left to send at sender’s site, it sets the value of 
control quad as 0x0. Otherwise, if no more message data is left, 
the number of hex-digits filled in ARP reply field excluding 
padding is calculated. If its value is exactly 11, control quad is 
set to 0xf else control quad is set as the number of hex digits 
used for padding in first eleven digits of Sender Hardware 
Address field. This sequence of steps from generation of 
random numbers to successful sending of ARP reply is repeated 
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till complete covert message is sent from the sender side. The 
sender side algorithm is shown in Fig 5. 
 
 
Input: A Covert message string S, a seed value SV. 
 
1. Input a covert message string S from user 
2. Convert the message string to hexadecimal code Sx 
3. For each possible local IP address on this LAN 
4.        Create an ARP Request 
5.        Broadcast it over the local area network 
6. End 
7. For each ARP reply received 
8.        Add the Source IP address of this reply to allocated  
       list AL. 
9. End 
10. For all possible local IP address for this LAN absent in AL      
11.        Add the local IP addresses to unallocated list UL 
12. End 
13. Use seed SV to generate next random number x,  
where x ∈ (1,255) 
14. Create a Local IP address A as 192.168.1.x 
15. If address A does not belong to UL, 
16.        Goto step 13. 
17. Wait for an ARP Request 
18.  If Req. Received==ARP Req. && ARP{Target IP}==  
192.168.1.x && ARP{Source IP}==IP of Covert  
Receiver, then 
19.        Create an ARP reply with Source IP =  
       192.168.1.x, Target IP = Source IP value received 
       in ARP request and Target Hardware Address =  
       Sender Hardware address value received in ARP 
       request 
20.        Pick first eleven or lesser (if less digits are left) Hex- 
       digits from Sx, call it S11 
21.        Update Sx as Sx – S11 . 
22.        Add S11 in the first eleven Hex digits of Sender  
       Hardware Address field of ARP reply 
23.        If Sx is not empty 
24.               Set the twelfth hex digit of Sender Hardware- 
              Address field (control quad) in ARP reply as 0x0 
25.        Else 
26.               If length(S11) < 11 
27.                      Compute 11 – length(S11), call it pad_num 
28.                      Pad the last pad_num number of hex digits 
                     in Sender Hardware Address field with  
                     value 0x0 for each hex digit. 
29.                      Set the twelfth digit (control quad) of Source  
                     Hardware Address field of ARP reply as  
                     pad_num in hexadecimal. 
30.               Else 
31.                      If length(S11) == 11 
32.                             Set the twelfth digit (control quad)  
33.                             of Sender Hardware Address field  
                            of ARP reply as 0xf. 
34. If Sx is empty 
35.       Exit 
36. Else 
37.       Go to Step 13 
Fig. 5. Sender Side Algorithm 
B. Receiver Side Algorithm 
Firstly, scan the LAN for unallocated local IP addresses. The list 
of unallocated local IP addresses is created exactly the same way 
as done in the sender side algorithm. Next, value of seed for 
random local IP address generation is inputted. Both receiver 
and sender enter the same seed value known to them in prior. 
After that a random number ‘x’ between 1 and 255 is generated 
with the same seed value described in the previous step. Further, 
we check if the IP address 192.168.1.x is present in the 
unallocated list or not. In case, this local IP address is not present 
in the unallocated list, the next random number is generated with 
the same seed value. This is repeated till we get an unallocated 
local IP address. Once an unallocated local IP address is found, 
the covert message receiver creates an ARP Broadcast Request 
with this randomly generated local IP address as value for 
Target IP Address field.  
 
Input: A seed value SV 
 
1. Initialize Covert_MSG string to NULL 
2. For each possible local IP address on this LAN 
3.        Create an ARP Request 
4.        Broadcast it over the local area network 
5. End 
6. For each ARP reply received 
7.        Add the source IP address to allocated list AL. 
8. End 
9. For all possible local IP addresses for this LAN, not 
present in AL      
10.        Add the local IP addresses to unallocated list UL 
11. End 
12. Use seed SV to generate next random number x,  
where x ∈ (1,255) 
13. Create a Local IP address A as 192.168.1.x 
14. If address A does not belong to UL, 
15.        Go to step 12 
16. Create an ARP Request with Target IP address as 
192.168.1.x 
17. Wait for an ARP reply 
18. If Req. Received==ARP Reply and ARP{Source IP}==  
     192.168.1.x, then 
19.        Fetch the Sender Hardware Address field as SHF 
20.        Set Control Quad, CQ = twelfth hex digit of SHF 
21.        If CQ == 0x0 
22.               Pick first eleven Hex-digits from SHF and  
              append it to Covert_MSG string 
23.               Goto step 12        
24.        Else 
25.               If CQ == 0xf 
26.                      Pick first eleven Hex-digits from SHF and  
                          append it to Covert_MSG string. 
27.               Else 
28.                      Convert CQ to decimal and call it CQ10 
29.                      Set temp = 11 – CQ10 
30.                      Pick first temp digits from SHF and append  
                          it to Covert_msg string 
31. Convert Covert_MSG (in hex) to string and read it as 
complete covert string 
32. Exit 
Fig. 6. Receiver Side Algorithm 
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After this ARP request is broadcasted, Host B enters a wait state 
waiting for a spoofed ARP reply for this request from covert 
message sender (Host A) only, as no node exists on this network 
with the same local IP Address as per the unallocated list created 
in previous step. In this way covert message sender partially 
abuses ARP spoofing and creates and sends an ARP reply. Once 
an ARP Reply is received at this host for the ARP Request just 
sent, the receiver checks for the Sender Hardware Address field 
in the received ARP response. The first eleven hex digits carry 
the covert data with/without padding. 
The twelfth hexadecimal digit or the last quad in this Ethernet 
address is the control quad which tells two things. Firstly, if the 
sender wishes to send more data or this is the last message and 
secondly, if there is any padding in the first eleven hex digits or 
not. If the value of this control bit is 0x0, it means that the sender 
has more data to send and no padding is used in eleven hex digits. 
Following that, steps beginning from generation of random IP till 
processing of the received ARP reply, are repeated till the value 
of control quad received in the ARP reply is non zero. If the value 
of control quad is 0xf in hexadecimal, it is interpreted as the last 
data message with zero padding (meaning all eleven quads hold 
relevant covert message data). And if the value of control bit is 
anything other than 0 and 0xf, it is interpreted as last data 
message with the value of control quad signifying the number 
of quads that contain padded data. For example, if the value of 
control quad is 0xa, it means out of the eleven data quads, last 
ten quads hold padded value and only the first quad has relevant 
covert data value. The receiver side algorithm for this technique 
is given in Fig 6. 
Figure 7 shows the time and flow diagram of our proposed 
technique. 
Fig. 7. Flow Diagram of ARPNetSteg. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
A. Implementation 
To implement and test ARPNetSteg, we created a Local Area 
Network which consisted of a covert message sender (Host A) 
and a covert message receiver (Host B) who wish to 
communicate over a LAN. The local IP address of Host A was 
192.168.1.4. The local IP address of Host B was 192.168.1.14. 
There were many other devices connected to Router. The local 
IP address of the Router was 192.168.1.1 in this LAN. 
In the first step, both Host A and Host B created a list of 
unused or unallocated local IP addresses in this LAN. After the 
successful creation of this list, a common seed value (known in 
prior to both the sender and the receiver) was entered. The 
purpose of this seed was to pick same order of random local IP 
addresses from the unallocated list (created in the previous step) 
for communication between the sender and the receiver. After 
choosing a random local IP address, the covert message receiver 
(Host B) created and sent an ARP broadcast request having 
Target IP Address set to this randomly selected local IP address 
value from the previous step. Scapy [20] library with Python 
was used to create and send ARP packets. On the other side, the 
covert message sender (Host A) after generating its list of 
unallocated local IP addresses, waited for a Broadcast Request 
for the same target IP address (generated in previous step with 
the same seed value). As the Broadcast Request for this IP 
address was received by the covert message sender, it created a 
spoofed ARP reply for this request. Since there was no node 
over the LAN which had this same local IP address, hence only 
covert message sender responded to this ARP Broadcast 
Request. In this ARP reply message, the covert message sender 
entered the covert data in the Source Hardware Address field. In 
case of Ethernet, the hardware address is 6 Bytes or 48 bits long. 
The covert message sender stored the message in the first 44 bits 
of Ethernet address, encoded in hexadecimal notation. The last 
quad (4 bits) as intended was used as control quad. The length 
of covert message is used to decide the number of ARP requests 
required to transfer the complete message. If the covert message 
could be accommodated in less than first 44 bits, then the value 
of control quad was set to the number of padding hexadecimal 
digits added to the message to make it 44 bits long. Otherwise, 
if covert message used all the 44 bits then the value of control 
quad was set to 0xf in hexadecimal. If more than 44 bits was 
required to send the complete message, the control quad was set 
to 0x0.  After the successful creation of this ARP reply packet a 
unicast ARP reply was sent to Host B, who is the covert message 
receiver. This receiver on receiving this message extracted data 
from Sender Hardware Address field of the ARP reply header 
and further checked the control quad. If the value of control 
quad was 0x0, the first eleven hex-digits were stored as covert 
data and also it was interpreted that the covert message sender 
wants to send more data, consequently it sent another Broadcast 
ARP Request using Target IP address field value as the second 
unallocated random IP value generated with the same seed.  
However, if the value of control quad was non-zero, there were 
two interpretations. If its value was 0xf, it interpreted it as the 
last message data with zero padding. And if the value of control 
quad was anything other than 0 and 0xf, it was interpreted as 
last message with the value of control quad signifying the 
number of quads that contain padded data. Depending on the 
value of control quad the covert message was fetched 
accordingly. Further, to capture the sent and received packets at 
both sender and receiver, Wireshark [21] packet analyzer was 
used. Wireshark is a freely available tool that is used for analysis 
of packets flowing over any network. 
B. Results 
The technique demonstrated in Section IV was implemented 
and experimented over a Local Area Network. We entered a 
secret message at Host A and it was successfully transferred to 
Host B using ARP Request and ARP Reply messages. Figure 8 
and 10 show the console snapshots of successful sending and 
receiving of desired ARP messages at sending and receiving 
devices respectively. 
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The covert message entered at the sender site was “Hi! This 
is a Covert message..”, which was 30 characters long as shown 
in Fig. 8. Hence it required six ARP requests and reply pairs to 
communicate covertly with our technique. Wireshark tool was 
used to capture packets coming in and going out of Host A and 
Host B. A screenshot of ARP packets carrying covert data from 
Host A in six ARP replies corresponding to ARP requests 
received from Host B is shown in Fig 9 using Wireshark. 
Figure 11 shows another Wireshark screenshot that captured 
ARP request packets sent from receiver side (Host B) and the 
corresponding ARP replies received with covert data at the 
receiver side (Host A). More Experiments were conducted to 
send different covert messages and all reached the destination 
accurately.  
Fig. 8. Console at Host A (Covert Message Sender). 
 
Fig. 9. Wireshark snapshot at Sender Site 
 
Fig. 10. Console at Host B (Covert Message Receiver) 
 
 
Fig. 11. Wireshark snapshot at Receiver site. 
 
Further, in our algorithm one vital step is creation of the list of 
unallocated local IP addresses. If any ARP request or reply 
packet of an existing node gets lost over the network, it will 
result in an inaccurate list. Thus, to make sure we get accurate 
lists at the sender’s and the receiver’s site, the ARP requests for 
which no reply has been received in the first iteration, may be 
resent over the network. We called it as retries. Figure 12 and 
13 shows the effect of increasing retries on time taken to create 
the unallocated list of local IP addresses and accuracy 
respectively. These values were calculated after taking an 
average of recorded values of error and time taken to create 
unallocated list for ten executions for each retrial value from 0 
to 4. It was observed that the accuracy increased largely with 
one retry, but the increase in accuracy with further increase in 
the number of retries was minimal. Also, as we increased the 
number of retries the number of ARP packets over the network 
and execution time of our algorithm increased almost linearly. 
Thus, we freezed our algorithm with retry value of 1. 




Fig. 12. Time Taken to Create Unallocated List Vs. Number of Retries 
 
Fig. 13. Accuracy of unallocated list vs Number of Retries 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A Network Steganography technique ARPNetSteg, using 
Address Resolution protocol for Network Steganography is 
proposed and presented in this paper. In ARPNetSteg, the 
devices that wish to communicate covertly exploit the 
vulnerability of ARP spoofing partially without harming data 
flows to any other node on the network. Both the sender and 
receiver device start with creating a list of unallocated local IP 
addresses simultaneously. The sender and receiver use a 
common (mutually agreed) seed value to generate the same 
sequence of unused local IP addresses to communicate covertly. 
After receiving a desired ARP request as per the seed value, the 
sending device communicates by creating and sending a spoof 
ARP reply and further filling covert data and control 
information in the Sender Hardware Address field of this ARP 
reply. More ARP requests using the same seed are generated by 
the covert receiver after reading the control information present 
in the covert data last received. This control information carries 
the necessary information whether sender wants to send more 
covert data or not.  
Our technique is capable of sending message of any length by 
breaking a large message into small messages of length 44 bits 
or lesser in each. Currently, the reliability of our technique 
depends upon matching of the lists of unallocated local IP 
addresses generated both at the sender’s and the receiver’s side. 
To make sure, that these lists match, we reconsidered all the 
unallocated local IP addresses present in the unallocated lists 
and generated Broadcast ARP request for all of them again. The 
local IP addresses for which a reply is received is further moved 
from unallocated to allocated list. With this, we successfully 
implemented a system that was able to send 44 bits of covert 
data per ARP reply message.  
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